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1 
OBJECTS OF INTERPRETATION 
Richard Ekins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is the object of interpretation? The question is 
ambiguous. The object may be either that which falls to be 
interpreted or the point of interpretation. This Article maintains 
that the central object of constitutional interpretation is the 
Constitution, which is an intentional lawmaking act rather than a 
text floating free in the world, and that the point of such 
interpretation is primarily to understand the meaning that those 
who made the Constitution intended to convey by promulgating 
the text in question.1 I take as my foil Cass Sunstein’s recent 
argument, in these pages, that there is nothing that interpretation 
just is.2 His argument aims to demonstrate that all the familiar, 
established approaches to constitutional interpretation—
originalist and non-originalist alike—are consistent with the idea 
of interpretation and that judges are free to choose whichever 
approach they think will have the best consequences in their time 
and place. I contend, on the contrary, that Sunstein 
misunderstands the way that intention works in language use in 
general and that the various alternatives to intentionalism that he 
outlines each fail. His idea of interpretation is empty and the 
radical interpretive choice for which he argues is ruled out by the 
nature of the Constitution. The final part of the Article considers 
the various ways in which one might understand the Constitution 
 
 * Fellow of St John’s College; Associate Professor, University of Oxford; Associate 
Professor, TC Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland. I am grateful to Larry 
Alexander and Mikolaj Barczentewicz for helpful comments on an earlier draft; the usual 
disclaimer applies.  
 1. See generally RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012); 
Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013); 
Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010); Richard Ekins, How 
to Be a Free People, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 163 (2013); Richard Ekins, Interpretive Choice in 
Statutory Interpretation, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2014). 
 2. Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 193 (2015). 
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as an object requiring interpretation and outlines the significance 
that this understanding has for interpretive practice. 
II. INTENTION AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE USE 
While the balance of Sunstein’s article considers other 
approaches to interpretation, including public meaning 
originalism and various forms of non-originalism, the argument 
that interpretation centers on intentions is his main target. He 
outlines the argument thus: “[c]onsider one view: In interpreting 
the meaning of words, we ask about authorial intentions . . . That 
is what it means to interpret words.”3 This is a problematic way of 
framing the alternatives. The object of interpretation in ordinary 
communication is not to interpret words but to interpret language 
use, which is to say some person’s rational act of uttering some 
words in some context for some reasons.4 Sunstein’s stress on 
words, as opposed to utterances or communicative acts, is 
confirmed when he goes on to say that “[i]t is true that in ordinary 
life, we tend to interpret words in this way.”5 
Having outlined an example of ordinary communication, 
where one friend asks another to “meet [me] at [my] favorite 
restaurant,” Sunstein goes on to say: “It might even be consistent 
with ordinary usage to say that in ordinary conversational settings, 
interpretation of other people’s words amounts to an effort to 
elicit their intentions.”6 
One must ask: ordinary usage of what? The answer is the 
term “interpretation” itself. Sunstein here and throughout the 
article aims to outline ways of using the term “interpretation” 
rather than explaining what interpretation is or should be.7 This 
strategy makes him a hostage to the breadth of linguistic usage 
rather than a student of the idea he aims to explore and the limits 
of which he intends to trace. Sunstein might reply that the very 
title of his article disavows any idea that interpretation has a 
constant nature, but this reply is problematic in two ways. First, 
the article does outline a theory about the nature of 
interpretation, but a thin theory that arbitrarily takes as 
 
 3. Id. at 194. 
 4. EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, supra note 1, at 210–11, 245–46. 
 5. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 194. 
 6. Id. at 194–95. 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 196. 
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controlling the various ways in which the term is used by language 
users. Second, the stress on the fact of ordinary usage obscures the 
reasons why “interpretation” should be understood in this way.8 
While conceding that intention (often, usually) has priority 
in interpreting ordinary language use, Sunstein’s concern is to 
avoid the conclusion that this is fundamental to language use in 
general. He says: “Let us suppose that in ordinary conversation, 
most people understand the idea of interpretation to involve a 
search for authorial intentions. Even in that context, such an 
understanding is not mandatory; we could imagine the view that 
interpretation involves a search for public meaning, rather than 
authorial intentions.”9 
One can imagine the view, but is it plausible? Is it a view that 
one should adopt? The quoted passage ends in a footnote which 
says that “such an approach would make conversation work less 
well,” referring to science fiction characters who act in this way 
with unfortunate (but humorous) results.10 The footnote refutes 
Sunstein’s argument: the humor works because the characters 
misinterpret the utterances of others, failing to understand other 
persons, missing the meanings they intend to convey. 
Sunstein says that we ask about intentions in interpreting 
ordinary conversation “for a pragmatic reason; the goal of the 
particular communication will not be met if we do not.”11 
Relatedly, “[i]f interpretation entails that practice [of asking 
about intentions], it is because in the relevant context, that is the 
best way to understand the term.”12 This invocation of the goal of 
a particular communication is striking. Persons have goals; 
communications do not. The confusion here is to take the 
communication to exist as an object apart from the people who 
communicate—apart from the speaker who aims to convey some 
meaning to her hearer, who in turn aims to infer the intended 
meaning in question. However, communication succeeds only if 
the speaker makes clear the meaning she intends to convey, that 
is, only if the audience recognizes that this is the meaning she 
intends to convey. Conformity to ordinary usage aside, it is not 
clear what Sunstein thinks makes an understanding of 
 
 8. See also EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
 9. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 195. 
 10. Id. at 195 n.16. 
 11. Id. at 196. 
 12. Id. 
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“interpretation” the best in some context or other. Language use 
consists in one person’s attempt to convey an intended meaning 
by uttering some words in some context, which meaning other 
persons should try to recognize.13 The speaker’s intended 
meaning is the intelligible object of the hearer’s process of 
inference, such that there is good reason to term these inferences 
“interpretations” and to withhold the label from other modes of 
engagement with the speaker’s choice of words. One may perform 
a function on her choice of words, say pretending that it is written 
in code by an imaginary speaker, but in so doing one is ignoring 
the reality of the language use as such. 
The main part of the article, as I say, aims in effect to 
establish that neither inferring intended meaning nor any other 
established course of judicial action is required or proscribed by 
the idea of interpretation itself. In this part of the article, Sunstein 
aims to establish that even outside the law intentions only matter 
sometimes.14 He argues that when a supervisor tells an employee 
what to do, the employee should ordinarily ask what his 
supervisor meant.15 However, “even subordinates sometimes ask 
about something other than speaker’s intentions; everything 
depends on the role of the subordinate, some of whom might have 
a different or less deferential role.”16 When would it ever be 
intelligible for an employee to ask about something other than 
what his supervisor meant? Sunstein does not say, but his stress 
on the role of the subordinate is telling, for he implies that some 
“subordinates” should be free to depart from what they have been 
instructed, should be free to remake the instruction into a more 
pleasing form. But this is to confuse understanding another 
person’s communicative act with the question of whether, and if 
so how far, one should conform to its injunctive content. 
For my part, I can see why the employee should think about 
more than what the supervisor in fact meant to convey. The 
employee might consider what the supervisor plans to achieve by 
the instruction—the intentions that explain the intended 
meaning—or how some third party is likely to understand the 
supervisor, whether his supervisor in turn, or a union official, or a 
tribunal or court in subsequent legal action. But these alternatives 
 
 13. EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, supra note 1, at 193–96. 
 14. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 195–96. 
 15. Id. at 196. 
 16. Id. 
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are not really alternatives, for they all track inferences, whether 
one’s own or someone else’s, about what the language user (the 
supervisor) in fact intended. For Sunstein to say that “everything 
depends on the role of the subordinate”17 is to make clear that he 
understands interpretation to be detachable from the act of 
language use—the supervisor’s act, not the employee’s—which 
falls to be understood. But this detachment is to give up on 
understanding and instead to license a subsequent act of language 
use—the nominal interpreter’s—which takes advantage of the 
words uttered by some other. 
The mistake here is again to conceive of communication as 
an object apart from a communicator. The reason for the mistake 
is that Sunstein runs together the question about what the 
supervisor’s instruction means with the question of what 
employees should do. It may be that an employee may or should 
refuse to do as instructed, whether because the instruction is 
unlawful or unreasonable or simply inconvenient, but this is a 
course of action that follows after one interprets (which is to say, 
understands) the instruction, which requires one to understand 
what the supervisor is trying to convey. There are of course 
reasons why an employee might prefer to frame a refusal to obey 
as an interpretation of the supervisor’s instruction (“I thought you 
meant X!”), but the standing possibility of deliberate (even if 
reasonable) misinterpretation hardly changes what it is to 
interpret. (This analysis is all consistent, I should add, with 
employees reasonably taking for granted that supervisors are 
likely to issue lawful, reasonable instructions.) 
Sunstein anticipates an objection to his argument that 
intention is central in ordinary communication but that this 
centrality is limited and turns on particular reasons, which do not 
hold in other contexts.18 The objection is that meaning turns on 
intention. Much of my argument above makes a similar point, 
although I would frame it a little differently: to understand some 
person’s act of language use is to infer the meaning they intend to 
convey. Sunstein dismisses the objection summarily, relying on 
the discussion yet to come of interpretation in law to establish that 
the objection just fails in the legal context. In a footnote, he 
doubts whether the objection holds even in ordinary 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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communication, imagining a pattern of clouds spelling out the 
word “God,” and concluding that the meaning of words may turn 
on conventions apart from inference about any author’s 
intentions.19 There are two problems with the response. First, by 
hypothesis, there is no communication here, for there is no 
speaker. Second, the truth that sentences have meanings does not 
refute the priority of intention in interpretation, for what falls to 
be understood in any particular communicative context is some 
agent’s act of language use.20 I turn to consider further the 
intelligibility and relevance of sentence meaning in the next 
section below. 
III. THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF PUBLIC MEANING 
ORIGINALISM 
Whatever may be the case in relation to ordinary 
communication, Sunstein argues that interpretation in law, 
especially constitutional interpretation, need not center on 
speaker’s intentions. He maintains that the idea of interpretation 
does not entail any form of originalism and does not rule out the 
established, familiar forms of non-originalism, such as Breyer’s 
“active liberty” approach or Dworkin’s “moral reading[].”21 His 
method is to consider various interpretive approaches in turn 
(originalist and non-originalist), arguing that each is plausible, 
that each falls within the capacious idea of interpretation, and that 
therefore one cannot argue for any one of them on the basis that 
this approach just is required by the very idea of interpretation. 
Instead, the choice the interpreter confronts—amongst various 
plausible modes of interpretation—should be made on the basis 
of the consequences its adoption is likely to have. In section V 
below, I consider more closely this theory of interpretive choice, 
and the radical contingency Sunstein embraces, but first I examine 
his argument that there is a range of plausible interpretive 
approaches such that the centrality of speaker’s intention in 
ordinary language use does not extend to law. 
It is “plainly false,” Sunstein maintains, to say that in law “the 
idea of meaning” depends on “some kind of judgment about the 
author’s intentions.”22 True, one way of thinking about 
 
 19. Id. at 196 n.17. 
 20. See, e.g., EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, supra note 1, at 194. 
 21. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 202–03. 
 22. Id. at 196. 
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interpretation is to conceive of it as a search for speaker’s intent 
and in ordinary life this is the usual way. But it is just one amongst 
many. For “it is easy to think of cases in which interpretation does 
not operate by reference to such intentions.”23 He does not go on 
to give any examples of such cases. His earlier examples from 
ordinary life fail to prove the point, viz. science fiction characters 
who misunderstand others, employees who ignore or misconstrue 
the instructions of supervisors, or one who sees words in cloud 
formations. Each example is at best misinterpretation. (In the 
earlier iteration of this paper he discussed the interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent,24 which was, I argued elsewhere,25 a 
problematic and underdeveloped example.) Instead, he points out 
that for Justice Scalia the object of interpretation—what one 
should find—is the text’s original public meaning rather than the 
original intention of its author.26 And he quotes Scalia’s remarks 
in Heller about the importance of the principle that the 
Constitution was written to be understood by voters, such that its 
words were used in a normal, non-technical fashion.27 
Sunstein takes the disagreement amongst originalists about 
whether original meaning or original intentions should be 
authoritative to be “a point that suggests that interpretation, to 
qualify as such, need not be focused on intentions.”28 He makes 
the point even more clearly when he “insist[s] that a prominent 
understanding of originalism—as involving public meaning rather 
than intentions—is enough to demonstrate that attention to 
subjective intentions is not built into the very idea of 
interpretation.”29 This is a non sequitur. Disagreement about 
whether interpretation involves a search for either speaker’s 
intention or for public meaning does not entail that the 
disagreement is misconceived. Sunstein wrongly takes for 
granted, again, that the idea of interpretation (in law as in 
ordinary life) includes whatever some language users take to fall 
within the term. 
 
 23. Id. at 197. 
 24. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING 
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 19–32 (2009). 
 25. Ekins, Interpretive Choice in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 26. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 197 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008)). 
 27. Id. at 197 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 576). 
 28. Id. at 197. 
 29. Id. at 198. 
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There are good reasons, I say, to think that original public 
meaning is not an intelligible alternative to intended meaning, 
however plausible it looks at first glance.30 Recall the quote from 
Scalia above, which understands the Constitution by reasoning 
about the purposes of those who wrote it, about the sense in which 
they intended to use the words in question. Scalia assumes, it is 
true, that there was a stable public meaning to be adopted, but the 
principle he discerns is not detachable from inference about 
intention. More generally, notwithstanding the number of persons 
who take public meaning seriously, there are good reasons to 
doubt its coherence. Sunstein provides one such reason when he 
queries why one should focus on original public meaning rather 
than contemporary public meaning. The right response, I say, is 
to stress that the adoption of the Constitution was an authoritative 
lawmaking act, the point of which was to introduce a framework 
for government. This stress on intentional lawmaking choice, and 
on the reasoning that makes sense of it, involves reasoning about 
the intentions of the author of the document. That is, the good 
reasons to focus on original rather than contemporary public 
meaning are reasons to focus on the intentions of the language 
user that chose the Constitution. 
There is a difference between sentence meaning and 
intended meaning.31 The semantic content of a sentence, 
generated by the combination of word meanings and syntax and 
taken in isolation from the context of its utterance and the person 
of its utterer, is open for study. The study of sentences in this way 
is important and interesting, but it tells us rather less about the 
nature of language use than lawyers often assume, not least since 
sentence meaning is very often much narrower and more austere 
(or absurd) than the meanings standardly conveyed by the use of 
such sentences by actual speakers intending to communicate with 
others.32 Away from the logician’s chopping table one does not 
encounter sentences floating free from an agent’s use of those 
sentences to convey some meaning or other. True, one often does 
not know precisely who the agent is, or one may be mistaken 
about the agent’s identity or character, but in attempting to 
understand an act of language use one attempts to infer what the 
 
 30. Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, supra note 1, at 541–42; see also 
Alexander, Telepathic Law, supra note 1, at 140–41. 
 31. EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, supra note 1, at 194–96. 
 32. Id. at 196–205. 
1 - EKINS_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17 8:48 AM 
2017] OBJECTS OF INTERPRETATION 9 
 
agent intended to convey. If there is no agent, then what appears 
to be language use (say, the marks on the beach or shapes in the 
clouds) is not, save in the odd way that the observer imagines or 
pretends that the marks in question are someone’s act of language 
use. There is nothing unintelligible about imposing on a form of 
words some meaning that a possible or imagined language user 
might use those words to convey. But in such imposition the 
nominal interpreter is in truth the speaker or author. 
Public meaning originalism is mistaken about the nature of 
meaning and language use. Particular instances of language use 
do not have a public meaning in any sense other than the best 
inference about intended meaning. There is no middle way 
between intended meaning and sentence meaning and in 
understanding any particular act of language use it is the former 
that should be our object. (Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s theory of 
utterance meaning attempts to find a middle way, with its stress 
on how the hearer reasonably understands the speaker’s intended 
meaning, but the attempt fails.33) Speakers exploit sentence 
meaning to convey their intended meaning, but sentence meaning 
is not itself transparent, in law or otherwise, for what ordinary 
language users are likely to try to convey in uttering the sentences 
in question or for how those utterances are likely to be 
understood. However, the appeal of public meaning originalism is 
not in its theory of meaning.34 Instead, it is at best an attempt to 
square the insight that the adoption of the Constitution was an 
intentional lawmaking act, which introduced legal propositions 
which should have a stable content and should not be changed 
without subsequent deliberate action, with the concern that the 
Constitution is a problematic communicative act, for it is not clear 
who the speaker is or how or if that speaker had an intended 
meaning to convey. 
The truth in public meaning originalism is that the meaning 
of an act of language use, such as the promulgation of a document, 
is found at the time of its use. The linguistic conventions that 
prevail at that time help frame the formation and inference of 
 
 33. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Marmor on Meaning, Interpretation, and Legislative 
Intention, 1 LEGAL THEORY 439, 441–44 (1995); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1 (1997). But see EKINS, THE NATURE OF 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT, supra note 1, at 209–10. 
 34. But see Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Illinois Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.  
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intended meaning. In conveying some meaning to a large and 
distant audience, speakers and authors have good reason to 
attempt to speak clearly and directly. Nothing in the sheer fact of 
disagreement amongst originalists undermines these 
propositions. Sunstein relies on the plausibility of the argument 
that original public meaning is the object of interpretation to 
refute the argument that the object of interpretation should be 
intended meaning—and vice versa.35 He maintains that a focus on 
original public meaning is justified if good consequences follow 
from such a focus, not because this is required by the idea of 
interpretation.36 In support of this argument, he calls in aid the 
fact that many scholars and judges rely on the good consequences 
of their originalism as a reason to adopt it.37 It follows, Sunstein 
argues, that while judges should stick with the text, they need not 
stick with the original meaning of the text if this would have 
terrible consequences.38 
There are two things to be said about Sunstein’s argument 
here. The first is that it assumes a distinction between the text of 
the Constitution and its meaning which many public meaning 
originalists deny. Departing from the original meaning of the text 
is to depart, the riposte should run, from the text, for the text is 
not just a template for later judicial action. (I argue later that like 
other enactments the Constitution is not a set of sentences to 
which judges are free to attach meanings: it is an intentional 
lawmaking act, with a meaning, specifically an intended meaning, 
that judges should aim to find.) The second is that it assumes that 
those originalists who point out the good consequences of 
originalism do not think originalism is otherwise justified. There 
is nothing unintelligible about Scalia relying on the nature of 
meaning and language use, as he sees it, to ground a theory of 
interpreting the Constitution, while also noting, for the 
unpersuaded, its good consequences. Relatedly, it bears 
mentioning that the grounding for a theory of interpretation need 
not be either the nature of interpretation or the consequences of 
adopting the theory. The grounding might instead be the 
relationship of authority between lawmaker and subjects, taken 
together with insight into the nature of language use, which the 
 
 35. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 198. 
 36. Id. at 198–202. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 200–01. 
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lawmaker employs to exercise authority. I explore this point 
further in sections V and VI, where I suggest that “interpretation” 
should not be the central organizing idea here. 
IV. NON-ORIGINALISM AND INTENDED MEANING 
The idea of interpretation does not entail originalism, 
Sunstein insists.39 And while it does rule out “approaches [which] 
cannot qualify as interpretation at all,” such as “substitut[ing] the 
best imaginable constitution for our own constitution,” the idea 
of interpretation is consistent with all established non-originalist 
approaches.40 Sunstein asks: 
Suppose a judge thinks that where the Constitution is vague or 
open-textured, he should interpret it to make the democratic 
process work as well as it possibly can—an idea that John Hart 
Ely and Justice Breyer have vigorously championed. Is that 
approach ruled off-limits by the very idea of interpretation? It 
is hard to see why.41 
It is not clear from this passage what it is for the Constitution 
to be vague, and indeed one could not say without some theory of 
meaning. When the Constitution is vague, it may call for 
specification so as to yield some concrete proposition capable of 
guiding action. There is good reason to think that dealing with 
vagueness is not interpretation, for one is not finding meaning, but 
dealing with the consequences of vague meaning.42 If Breyer’s 
stress on serving the democratic process were limited to instances 
of vagueness, where the original (intended) meaning of the 
Constitution was vague, it would not be ruled off-limits by the 
idea of interpretation, but likewise it would not be a theory of 
interpretation itself. 
Sunstein goes on to explain how he understands the scope of 
Breyer’s theory: 
Justice Breyer has argued that a democracy-protective 
approach, honoring “active liberty,” fits with the text and 
purposes of the document even if it does not fit with the 
original meaning, narrowly conceived. (Recall that some 
originalists think that the Constitution was deliberately written 
 
 39. Id. at 202. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 42. Timothy Endicott, Legal Interpretation, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
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in broad terms whose meaning was meant to evolve over 
time.)43 
This approach, as Sunstein outlines it, would thus seem to go 
beyond addressing the consequences of vagueness and instead to 
contemplate departures from original meaning.44 This is 
problematic as a theory of interpretation to the extent that it 
licenses “interpreters” to invent meanings that cannot be squared 
with the act of language use in question. However, it is not quite 
clear whether the theory does propose this. Sunstein’s equivocal 
term “original meaning, narrowly conceived” suggests otherwise, 
as does, especially, the parenthesis, which aims to square the 
approach with the original intentions in question, viz. adopting 
general terms that call for discretionary application over time. It 
is mistaken, I think, to say that the meaning of terms evolves over 
time. It would be better to say that the terms were meant (their 
intended meaning was) to be suitably general and to involve and 
to make possible a (wide) range of applications over time.45 
But let us assume, as Sunstein suggests, that Breyer’s 
approach contemplates substituting for the original meaning 
some other meaning, which better “fits with the text and purposes 
of the document.”46 The latter phrase is unfortunate for 
documents do not have purposes; rather, authors have purposes 
in writing documents. One infers the author’s intended meaning 
by reasoning about their likely purpose. Breyer’s approach would 
be defective as a theory of interpretation insofar as it substituted 
for the actual intended meaning some other meaning, which 
better fitted with his (or another judge’s) view of the meaning that 
would better serve the Constitution’s purposes or present day 
circumstances or so forth. It may be that the interpretation of the 
act of constitution-making involves not just finding the 
Constitution’s intended meaning but finding the reasoned choice 
that explains that meaning, which might warrant qualifying or 
extending that meaning. In this sense, the interpretation of a 
lawmaking act does not reduce to an understanding of language 
use alone. But this is not to set intention aside but to follow it ever 
 
 43. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 202 (footnotes omitted). 
 44. Id. at 202. 
 45. Richard Ekins, Updating the Meaning of Violence, 129 LAW Q. REV. 17 (2013); 
Lord Hoffmann, Judges, Interpretation and Self-Government, in LORD SUMPTION AND 
THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 67 (N.W. Barber et al eds., 2016). 
 46.  Sunstein, supra note 2, at 202. 
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more closely, attending to the detail of the complex intentions 
involved in the act of language use and, I say, the exercise of 
authority in service of which the language is used. This equitable 
interpretation, as one might term it, is centered on the original 
lawmaking act, including a sound understanding of the detail of 
the language use in question. 
The passage quoted above continues: “Breyer’s approach 
must be evaluated on its merits; it cannot be ruled off the table. 
To his credit, Breyer is candid about this point, and contends that 
the consequences of his preferred approach would be good.”47 
But the merits of the approach turn not on whether its 
adoption would have good consequences but on whether the 
approach makes sense of the nature of language use (and thence 
of authority) and, relatedly, whether its adoption would involve 
the illicit substitution of some other constitution “for our own 
constitution” which Sunstein decries. The assertion that departing 
from original meaning is not ruled out by the idea of 
interpretation turns on a very thin, arbitrary understanding of that 
idea. 
Much the same analysis holds for Sunstein’s discussion of 
Dworkin’s view “that the Constitution should be taken to include 
abstractions that invite moral reasoning from judges.”48 For 
Sunstein, this approach “certainly count[s] as interpretation 
within permissible linguistic understandings of the term.”49 But 
key to Dworkin’s argument, at least in its mature form, is that the 
framers of the Constitution did in fact intend to convey abstract 
formulations, intending and contemplating that the vague 
formulations would be applied to matters as they arose. To this 
extent, Dworkin just is an originalist:50 the grounding of his theory 
of constitutional adjudication is an account of intended meaning. 
True, Dworkin has a further argument about the nature of 
constructive interpretation, in which the interpreter aims to make 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 202. 
 49. Id. at 203. 
 50. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 262–63 (1999); Larry 
Alexander, Was Dworkin an Originalist?, in THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN 299 
(Will Waluchow et al eds., 2016); Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional 
Interpretation, supra note 33, at 21; Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in 
Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Reading of the Constitution, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1280 (1997). But see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2009). 
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the object of interpretation the best it can be, by way of a theory 
that accounts for the material in question (fit) and shows it in as 
good a light as possible (justification). And this theory has some 
force in relation to the development of case law. Is it a good 
theory for interpreting the meaning of a statute or Constitution? 
Sunstein notes that Dworkin’s theory can accommodate a range 
of interpretative methods in turn but resists concluding that 
constructive interpretation is the one way to understand 
interpretation, for: “[i]f we believe that interpretation involves the 
search for authorial intentions, we will not much care about 
justification. We will attempt to identify a fact: What did the 
author(s) intend?”51 Quite so, but on Sunstein’s own premises it 
would be wrong to think that interpretation in fact involved the 
search for author’s intentions. This would be at most one mode 
amongst many of interpretation, one function that one could 
choose, if so minded, to perform on a text to generate a meaning, 
which again would be one amongst many. At work here is an 
important presupposition, viz. that there are many meanings that 
can be attributed to (or foisted on) a text, such that there are many 
legitimate modes of interpretation, amongst which the interpreter 
faces a choice. The counterargument is that the nature of 
language use—in law as much as in ordinary life—makes clear the 
priority of the author’s intended meaning. The substitution of 
some other meaning in place of this intended meaning may or may 
not be justified—the philosophy of language cannot speak to 
this—but it is a curious interpretation (understanding) of the act 
of language use in question. Or, perhaps it would be better to say 
that to attribute such a meaning would be to exploit, but not to 
understand, that act. 
V. INTERPRETIVE CHOICE AND THE IDEA OF 
INTERPRETATION 
The plausibility of each particular interpretive approach, 
Sunstein argues, undercuts the claim of any interpretive approach 
to be mandatory. Hence, he contends that public meaning 
originalism falls to be evaluated alongside other equally 
intelligible alternatives, including other forms of originalism and 
various non-originalist approaches. That is, judges should 
evaluate the consequences of adopting public meaning 
 
 51. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 204. 
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originalism as opposed to any of the other possible (plausible) 
interpretive theories. The best originalist theorists recognize this 
truth, Sunstein notes, and hence they argue that their method has 
better consequences than other methods rather than that the 
latter do not count as interpretation at all. This mode of argument 
is required, Sunstein continues, because the idea of interpretation 
rules very little in or out, and more particularly because 
originalists must confront and disarm the problem that their 
method might very well give rise to awful consequences. 
Perhaps “the constitutional text, taken only as such, is good, 
or good enough. But suppose that it is a great deal worse if it is 
understood in light of its original meaning.”52 That is, perhaps its 
original meaning is “hopelessly undemocratic, or . . . entrenches 
racial injustice.”53 In this case, Sunstein asks, why should judges 
uphold the awful original meaning rather than some other 
meaning which avoids these consequences? He points to the 
Constitution’s broad phrases—protecting freedom of speech, 
guaranteeing due process of law and equal protection of law, 
vesting executive power in President—and says that “if these 
words were construed in accordance with their original meaning, 
understood in terms of its expected applications, our 
constitutional order would be far worse than it is today.”54 The 
sentence includes a footnote bracketing the question of whether 
originalism requires a focus on expected applications and 
maintaining that his point is just that it is a strong argument 
against a theory if it would make the constitutional system 
worse.55 This way of framing the question trades on the widely 
shared scholarly view that expected applications should not be 
decisive, precisely because they are distinguishable from original 
meaning.56 A better question would have been whether judges are 
free to depart from the Constitution’s original meaning, in the 
course of “interpreting” the Constitution, if they conclude that the 
meaning in question is unjust or even simply suboptimal. 
 
 52. Id. at 199. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 199–200 (footnotes omitted). 
 55. Id. at 200 n.33. 
 56. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Method of Text and ?: Jack Balkin’s Originalism 
with No Regrets, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 611, 614 (2012); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and 
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 443–44 (2007); Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism and its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 383, 384 (2007). 
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Aiming to establish that his view is not that judges may 
simply do whatever they please, Sunstein goes on to say, in a 
passage that is pivotal to the overall argument: 
True, we should agree that judges should be faithful to the text 
itself, even if the text were not as good as it is. If judges were 
not faithful to the text, it is fair to say that they would not be 
engaged in interpretation at all. If judges disregard 
authoritative texts, they cannot claim to be interpreting them. 
In that sense, the idea of interpretation does impose constraints 
on what judges may do. Moreover, legal systems do much 
better—and even count as legal systems—if judges are faithful 
to authoritative texts. If they do not, the rule of law is itself in 
jeopardy, because judges would appear to be empowered to do 
whatever they want. In that sense, there is an excellent 
consequentialist argument in favor of taking constitutional 
texts as binding. But under the assumptions I have given, why 
should judges stick not merely with the text but also with its 
original meaning? If the consequences of sticking with it would 
be terrible, and if those consequences could be avoided with 
another approach, shouldn’t judges consider that other 
approach?57 
The limit on the idea of interpretation, for Sunstein, is thus 
fidelity to the text itself. What does it mean to be faithful to the 
text (itself)? Sunstein does not tell us. He contrasts “the text” with 
“its original meaning.” Is the point then that the text is just the 
semantic content of the canonical document? It is unclear what 
else it could be, but of course Sunstein emphatically does not want 
to equate interpretation with this type of demanding textualism. 
The textualism for which he argues is rather less onerous: “[I]t is 
true that any theory of interpretation has to be textualist—not in 
the sense that it must always “follow” the text, or may never 
depart from its ordinary meaning, but in the sense that it must 
always make the text the foundation for interpretation.”58 
Again, what “the text” is remains unexplained. But the 
proposition that it grounds interpretation that does not follow the 
text is hardly the articulation of a discernible limit. 
If all the established, familiar modes of constitutional 
interpretation are legitimate, then judges must choose amongst 
them on normative (and consequentialist) grounds. However, 
Sunstein’s assertion that all the established modes are faithful to 
 
 57. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 200 (footnotes omitted). 
 58. Id. at 206. 
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the text is arbitrary. Each may purport to assign a meaning to the 
text, to present its conclusions as if they were conclusions about 
the meaning of the text, but this does not make it so. In truth, the 
text cannot be sensibly distinguished from its intended meaning, 
save by an exercise in make-believe—the pretense that these 
words lack a history or an agent or an intended audience or indeed 
anything that would mark them out as an actual instance of 
language use rather than as a set of counters in a game. 
Maintaining the rule of law, and recognizing authoritative texts as 
such, requires more than lip service to a form of words. 
Note also that Sunstein’s final two questions cut just as 
sharply against sticking with the text itself (the form of words or 
their semantic content) as they do against sticking with its original 
meaning. If the consequences of sticking with the text are terrible, 
and if one would avoid them by not sticking with (the awful parts 
of) the text, then why should not the judge act thus? The answer 
may be that the judge should not stick to the text. This would be 
an arguable conclusion about the moral obligations of judges but 
would not change the nature of constitutional interpretation or 
meaning, for the judicial refusal to uphold the text (and its 
meaning) might be justified but would be abandonment of 
authoritative direction not interpretation of such. There are 
plausible (if also defeasible) reasons why judges should not 
abandon an awful Constitution, such as upholding the rule of law 
and keeping faith with past acts of self-government. But then 
these reasons may require (so I and others argue) the judge to 
uphold the original meaning of the text, not simply “the text.” The 
whole structure of Sunstein’s discussion here is revealing. He is 
aware that he needs to square the openness of interpretation, as 
he sees it, with recognition of some limits thereon. But his 
argument that consequences matter is difficult to square with the 
idea that judges should not just substitute for the Constitution an 
alternative they would prefer.59 Indeed, it seems to me that in fact 
this is exactly what his argument licenses, subject to the rider that 
they should mask any such substitution in the appearance of 
interpretation, which is to say as a good faith attempt to 
understand some past act of language use. 
Fidelity to the text seems at best to be obscure. Sunstein 
explains his idea of interpretation further by way of Lawrence 
 
 59. Id. at 202. 
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Solum’s distinction between interpretation (finding linguistic 
meaning) and construction (giving legal effect to meaning).60 
Perhaps this distinction entails, Sunstein muses, that while there 
is nothing that construction just is, interpretation just is finding 
linguistic meaning.61 He concludes otherwise, reasoning that 
linguistic meaning fractures into original intention, original 
meaning, contemporary understandings, and so forth and that the 
term interpretation is, in legal practice, standardly used to 
encompass much that Solum deems construction.62 The latter 
argument again places too much weight on the apparent ordinary 
meaning of the term interpretation,63 which is not relevant. The 
former misunderstands language use: the various senses of 
linguistic meaning that Sunstein contemplates are not all equal, I 
say, and their apparent equality turns on their isolation from the 
context of language use in the world, by real persons, in which 
setting the central importance of the speaker’s intended meaning 
becomes obvious. Discussing Solum’s examples of changes in the 
meaning of “goal” and “domestic violence” since the 18th 
century, Sunstein says that in interpreting these terms we would 
be drawn to originalism.64 True enough, but why? He does not say. 
The reason for his attraction to originalism in this case is, I 
suggest, because it is very clear that to ignore the intended and/or 
original meaning in this case would be tantamount to abandoning 
the text itself. But this is always true, for whenever one abandons 
the meaning of the text (better, the meaning the text is used to 
convey)—even if the abandonment is subtle or not easily 
discerned—one is abandoning the text in the only sense that 
matters. 
For Sunstein, as for others,65 judges face an open choice 
amongst rival interpretive theories, none of which are ruled out 
by the idea of interpretation as such. Instead, they should simply 
choose whichever method is likely to make their particular 
 
 60. Id. at 204. See also Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 61. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 205. 
 62. Id. at 206. 
 63. See also id. at 203. 
 64. Id. at 205–06. 
 65. See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 355–87 (2011); ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION (2006); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 
(2000). But see Ekins, Interpretive Choice in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1. 
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constitutional order better, which turns on decision costs 
(complicating judgments) and error costs (bad outcomes).66 An 
interpretive method is less choice-worthy to the extent that it is 
more likely to produce bad outcomes, such as unsettling existing 
practices, failing to proscribe race or sex discrimination, or failing 
to secure the rights that citizens (deserve to) enjoy.67 
Disagreement about how to interpret the Constitution thus often 
effectively collapse to a disagreement about what count as good 
or bad outcomes.68 More generally, he continues, the case for or 
against choosing to adopt any interpretive theory must turn in 
part on the relative strengths and weaknesses of legislatures and 
courts: “If judges are excellent and error-free, their excellence 
bears on the choice of a theory of interpretation. If judges are 
likely to blunder, their fallibility bears on the choice of a theory 
of interpretation.”69 
Here as elsewhere Sunstein runs together the question of 
how to interpret the Constitution with the question of the 
authority judges ought to exercise. It may be that if judges are 
excellent and error-free they ought to be authorized to review 
legislative acts on wide grounds, but it does not follow that in the 
absence of such authorization their excellence empowers them so 
to act. That one is capable (or rather, thinks oneself capable: recall 
Sunstein is asking judges to evaluate their own capacities) may be 
a reason for others to entrust one with a certain task, but it is not 
a reason to think that one is free to remake the task with which 
one has been entrusted. The merits of judicial review may turn in 
part on the nature of constitutional interpretation,70 but it is very 
odd to think the reverse holds, viz. that sound interpretation 
varies with the interpreter.71 Sunstein’s discussion at this point 
echoes his earlier dubious analysis of the freedom some 
employees enjoy to flout their supervisor’s intended meaning 
under the guise of interpretation. 
 
 66. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 207. 
 67. Id. at 208. 
 68. Id. at 209. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Richard Ekins, Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law, 119 L. Q. REV. 
127, 137–38 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, Never Mind the Constitution, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1147, 1156–58 (2014). 
 71. Compare SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 358–59, with Ekins, Interpretive Choice in 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 15–18. 
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That Sunstein confuses a theory of adjudication with a theory 
of constitutional meaning and interpretation is confirmed by his 
argument for the contingent merits of a Thayerian approach to 
the Constitution or of his own minimalism. Neither approach is a 
theory about the interpretation of the Constitution—about how 
one finds and gives effect to its meaning or even about how one is 
to keep faith with its text. Indeed, in two footnotes Sunstein 
concedes that neither theory can be a complete account of 
constitutional interpretation because both require 
supplementation with an account of constitutional meaning.72 He 
asserts that neither “is ruled out by the Constitution itself. Each 
can be implemented in a way that firmly respects the document’s 
text and attempts to interpret it.”73 This assertion may be true but 
it is irrelevant to the wider claim, which it is deployed to support, 
that judges are simply free to choose whichever theory of 
constitutional meaning will better secure outcomes they prefer, 
including their own empowerment. 
VI. THE OBJECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
My disagreement with Sunstein is not about the meaning of 
the word “interpretation.” It would be closer to say that it 
concerns the idea of interpretation. But there are good reasons to 
think that there is little to be gained from analysis of 
interpretation in general, in isolation from some particular object 
that warrants interpretation. More precisely, one might say that 
interpretation should be understood in relation to some particular 
type of intelligible human action and is an attempt to understand 
that action. For Sunstein, the ordinary meaning of interpretation 
and/or the general idea it articulates are coterminous with the 
boundaries of legitimate adjudication. He takes for granted that 
judges have authority to interpret the Constitution, such that 
provided one can say that their action is in some sense an instance 
of interpretation then it is not illegitimate. This is not to say that 
Sunstein thinks all modes of adjudication are equally good—
judges should choose that mode which has better consequences in 
their time and place—but rather that he thinks the judicial choice 
of any one mode in particular cannot be illegitimate. 
 
 72. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 210 n.81, 211 n.83. 
 73. Id. at 211. 
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However, the Constitution does not invest judges with 
authority to do whatever some lawyers have been willing to label 
as interpretation. Strictly speaking the judicial power is not a 
power to interpret the law: it is a power to adjudicate disputes in 
accordance with law, which requires the judge, like every other 
subject of the law, to discern what the existing law is, how the legal 
sources bear on this particular controversy. It is a mistake, 
therefore, to ground an argument about how judges should 
interpret the Constitution in the diverse (undisciplined) ways in 
which we use the term interpretation. Pitched abstractly enough, 
to encompass such diverse objects as clouds, dreams, novels, 
nonsense poems, and traffic flows, it might well be true to say, 
with Sunstein, that there is nothing that interpretation just is. But 
the lack of unity in the idea of interpretation at this level of 
generality does not entail that interpretation of statutes or 
constitutions is also empty. It is worth entertaining the hypothesis 
that the nature of the source of law that falls to be understood 
bears strongly on how it may reasonably be understood. That is to 
say, before one can conclude that the Constitution is rightly open 
to many interpretive approaches one must reflect on the 
Constitution as an object requiring interpretation. 
Some such reflection is implicit in Sunstein’s work and 
indeed my argument above has traced at various points his 
reduction of the Constitution to a text alone. Recall that in 
outlining the idea of interpretation the limit he discerns is fidelity 
to the text. The limit is threadbare, as I have argued, for it permits 
one not to follow the text and is instead a requirement that the 
judge’s lawmaking choices be framed as if they were an account 
of the meaning of the text. The incredulity of others, especially 
the wider public, is the real limit on this exercise, which chimes 
with the stress on the bounds of the meaning of the word 
interpretation rather than the meaning of the Constitution 
properly understood. For Sunstein then, subject to a caveat I 
explore below, the Constitution is the text we have before us, 
which it falls to the judges now to invest with meaning. The text 
comes with no directions as to how it is to be interpreted, hence 
the judges must choose the rules that are to apply and perform a 
function on the text so as to generate its meaning. 
But the Constitution is not a text to exploit. The view that it 
is may help explain the diversity of interpretive approaches in 
practice (although at the cost of deeming most or all of them 
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false), but it does not perceive the nature of the language use that 
the promulgation of the Constitution involves or the shape of the 
lawmaking act in which such promulgation consists. These points 
are related, for as with statutes so too with the Constitution: law 
is made deliberately by an authority that uses language to convey 
some intended meaning. Still, they should be distinguished, if only 
to address a possible misunderstanding. Solum reasons that if 
“goal” is used in an eighteenth century letter then one should 
understand its meaning at the time and the same holds for the 
Constitution. Sunstein comments: 
That is true, but is the constitutional setting analogous? 
Consider the view that judges should decide, as a matter of 
principle, whether current practices do deny people “equal 
protection of the laws,” or violate “the freedom of speech,” 
rather than asking about the original meaning of those words. 
Whether that view is right or wrong is a normative question. It 
cannot be settled by an understanding of how communication 
through language works. Philosophical work on that topic does 
not resolve the question of the appropriate judicial role 
undertaken under the capacious rubric of “interpretation.”74 
The contrast in the second sentence is, I think, between “a 
matter of principle” and “the original meaning,” for it is the 
constitutionality of “current practices” that requires adjudication. 
Sunstein is quite right to say that what judges should do is not 
settled by the philosophy of language. But the philosophy of 
language does tell us something very important about the nature 
of language use, viz. that persons use texts (semantic content) to 
convey their intended meaning-content. If one adopts “a matter 
of principle” in place of “the original meaning” then one is not 
showing fidelity to the text in any meaningful sense—one is not 
understanding it as an act of language use but rather simply 
deeming it a canvas on which one projects the meanings one 
wishes had been intended. The continuity of law and the 
importance of self-government over time both provide very 
powerful reasons to consider the original meaning of the 
Constitution decisive. These are reasons that point one to the 
nature of the language use that is the Constitution’s adoption. 
Like a statute, the Constitution is not a text that invites 
exploitation by adjudicative bodies but a deliberate lawmaking 
act the intended meaning of which is to be upheld. The reasons 
 
 74. Id. at 207. 
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for constitution-making by deliberate adoption of some canonical 
text are reasons for the relevant authority to choose to introduce 
some particular propositions and to articulate them in the 
intended meaning of the canonical text it promulgates. The 
Constitution is thus an object in the sense that it is an intentional 
act, which falls to be understood as such. The law that act 
introduced into the life of the community remains good law until 
it expires on its own terms or is overtaken or amended by some 
subsequent act of lawmaking. This is how I understand the 
Constitution qua object and why I conclude that it is not rightly 
open to all of the many established interpretive approaches, for 
only some modes of reasoning recognize the Constitution’s nature 
and aim to understand its content accordingly. 
The Constitution is only part of the Constitution. The former 
is the law made by the lawmaking act that is the Constitution’s 
promulgation, whereas the latter is the ensemble of legal rules 
(including the Constitution, statutes and common law) and non-
legal rules (conventions) that frame how and by whom public 
power is exercised. Not every constitutional rule, in this broad 
(and British) sense of the term, is to be found in the meaning of 
Constitution or even in its authoritative judicial exposition. 
Recognizing, with Dworkin, that much constitutional law is found 
in the mass of judicial decisions, Sunstein asserts, first that “judges 
who interpret the Constitution owe a duty of fidelity to what has 
come before”75 (so not just to the text) and that one “recurring 
question is the relationship among the case law, social practices 
and the original understanding of the text.”76 He concludes that 
“the general concept of interpretation” permits different answers 
to that question.77 On this view, the object of constitutional 
interpretation would seem to be the judicial practice of working 
with the canonical text. Hence, one interprets not the text itself, 
such that its original meaning is not controlling, but the history of 
adjudication by reference to that text, which may take us 
increasingly far from that original meaning without abandoning it 
altogether. The living constitution, and its counterpart in Canada, 
“the living tree,” captures the idea of moving steadily beyond 
one’s foundations. 
 
 75. Id. at 203. 
 76. Id. at 204. 
 77. Id. 
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Much judicial interpretation of the Constitution has this cast 
to it. The history of interpretation rather than the Constitution 
itself becomes the object of further interpretation. This shift in 
focus may be a reasonable response to the injustice of the 
Constitution qua deliberate lawmaking act and the assertion of a 
nominal connection between the continuing practice and the text 
itself (shorn of its substance as intentional language use) may be 
a shrewd strategy to avoid public controversy. But it is clearly an 
abandonment of the lawmaking act that the Constitution in truth 
is and was and in that sense is not interpretation of the 
Constitution at all. The strategy is unstable, moreover, for the 
ongoing reference to the text of the Constitution retains some 
force and the practice remains in law answerable to further 
reflection about its true (which is to say, its intended) meaning. 
The revival of originalism in American constitutional practice 
may confirm the point. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The way to reason about how to understand the Constitution 
is not to reflect on the idea of interpretation itself, or the variety 
of theories of interpretation in practice, but to consider the 
Constitution as an object that requires understanding. The 
Constitution is not a set of free-floating sentences. Nor is it the 
history of adjudication by reference to such sentences. Rather, it 
is a deliberate lawmaking act, which falls to be understood by 
recognizing an intended meaning that articulates authoritative 
choices. The arguments contested in this Article aim to deny the 
priority of intended meaning in constitutional interpretation—but 
each fails. Intended meaning is and should be the object of 
interpretation in ordinary language and in law, including 
constitutional law. Neither the ordinary meaning of the word 
“interpretation” nor the diversity of theories of constitutional 
interpretation establishes otherwise. Further, neither public 
meaning originalism nor non-originalist theories constitute viable 
alternatives to an interpretive approach that centers on intended 
meaning. Constitutional interpretation is not the performance of 
some function on a text with which one may do as one pleases, but 
an exercise in understanding a past lawmaking act and the 
intended meaning in which it consists. It may sometimes be 
reasonable to substitute for the original object of interpretation—
the Constitution qua deliberate lawmaking act—some other 
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object, such as the history of past adjudication, but one should be 
clear that this substitution is itself a constitution-making act, one 
that tacitly abandons the authoritative act to which one pays 
continuing, but insincere, homage. 
 
